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Abstract 
This paper proposes a model representing a global economy which aims to become 
environmentally sustainable. The model looks both at the production side and the 
consumption side of the economy. Regarding the production side, the suggested model 
considers investment and innovation in climate technologies, whereas on the side of the 
consumption it takes into account economic and policy instruments to change the 
patterns of consumption of the households. The model follows a game theory approach 
and applies a theoretical framework à la Cournot. The results of the paper are the 
following: the model provides win-win solutions, namely strategic situations in which 
each country takes advantages by cooperating and competing at the same time within 
the global economy, and where each country gets a positive return. In fact, the model 
shows the convenience for each country to cooperate and suggests the implementation 
of policies in order to satisfy the basic requirements of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, in terms of production, consumption and climate change. 
 
Keywords: Climate Change; Environmental Sustainability; Model à la Cournot; 
Coopetitive Games; Green Economy 
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1. Introduction 
 
The paper starts from the conclusion of the Paris agreement COP21 of December 
2015 aiming at controlling carbon emissions, since "climate change is an urgent 
and irreversible threat to human societies and to the planet". The agreement, 
signed by 195 countries, asks for the maximum cooperation of all countries. In 
addition, the paper takes into account the targets of 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development of the United Nations for a better quality of life. This 
is why we propose a co-petitive model where cooperation is essential, but also 
competition is necessary, since the countries are competing in the markets. We 
have already developed a co-petitive model applying to a green economy. Carfì 
and Schilirò (2012a): ‘A co-petitive model for the green economy’, but it focused 
mainly on the production side by developing a strategy regarding low-carbon 
technologies. 
This paper represents a global economy which aims to become environmentally 
sustainable, but it looks both at the production side and the consumption side. 
Regarding the production side, the suggested model considers investment and 
innovation in climate technologies, whereas on the consumption side it takes 
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into account economic and policy instruments to change the patterns of 
consumption of the households. The model follows a game theoretic approach 
and applies a theoretical framework à la Cournot. 
Althought game-theoretical models are not systematically applied in coopetition 
studies, Game Theory has proved to be extremely useful for coopetition analysis. 
For example, Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995, 1996) argued that game 
theory is useful for understanding co-petitive situations. Clarke-Hill et al. (2003), 
Rodrigues et al. (2011), Stiles (2001) applied game theory for investigating 
strategic coopetition. Other authors have faced the problem of coopetition and 
competition (see Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Hagedoorn et al., 2001; Padula and 
Dagnino, 2007; Porter, 1985). 
Here, the authors use an original recent definition of a co-petitive game, in 
normal form, given by David Carfì. The model can suggest useful solutions to a 
specific co-petitive problem. This analytical framework enables us to widen the 
set of possible solutions from purely competitive solutions to co-petitive ones 
and, moreover, incorporates a solution designed “to share the pie fairly” in a 
win-win scenario. At the same time, it permits examination of the range of 
possible economic outcomes along a co-petitive dynamic path. We also propose 
a rational way of limiting the space within which the co-petitive solutions apply. 
The basic original definition we propose and apply for co-petitive games is that 
introduced by Carfì and Schilirò (2014a, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2011) 
and Carfì (2015, 2012, 2009a, 2009b, 2008). The method we use to study the 
payoff space of a normal-form game is due to Carfì (2015, 2009b), Carfì and 
Musolino (2015a, 2015b, 2014a, 2014b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2012a, 2012b), 
and Carfì and Schilirò (2014a, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2011). Other 
important applications, of the complete examination methodology, are 
introduced by D. Carfì and co-authors in Agreste et al. (2012), Arthanari et al. 
(2015), Baglieri et al. (2016a, 2016b, 2012), Campbell and Carfì (2017, 2015), 
Carfì and Donato (2016a, 2016b), Carfì et al. (2017a, 2017b), Carfì, et al. 
(2017), Carfì, et al. (2016), Carfì and Okura (2014), Carfì and Romeo (2015), 
Carfì and Pintaudi (2012). 
A complete treatment of a normal-form game is presented and applied by Carfì 
(2017, 2015, 2012, 2009a, 2009b, 2008), Carfì and Donato (2016a, 2016b), 
Carfì and Musolino (2015a, 2015b, 2014a, 2014b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2012a, 
2012b), Carfì and Perrone (2013, 2011), Carfì and Ricciardello (2013, 2012 a, 
2012b, 2010, 2009) and Carfì and Schilirò (2014a, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 
2011), Donato (2017). Carfì (2008) proposes a general definition and explains 
the basic properties of Pareto boundary, which constitutes a fundamental 
element of the complete analysis of a normal-form game and of a co-petitive 
interaction. 
Moreover, to develop our ideas on environmental sustainability, we referred to 
Baumert et al. (2005), Chu (2016), Drolc (2013), Fiala (2008), Foley et al. 
(2011), Gauthier et al. (2016), Godland R. (2005), Leitzmann (2003), Lyakhov 
et al. (2016), Schilirò (2009), United Nations (2011). 
 
 
2. Methods 
 
3 
 
In our model we have two players. 
• The 1st player A is constituted by the group of countries which are developed 
and possess the technological and financial capabilities to invest in green 
technologies. These are countries able to develop, produce innovative 
technologies and products “green oriented", adopt alternative sources of energy 
in order to fight the global warming. 
According to the Paris agreement COP21 the developed countries have a leading 
role in mitigation action through absolute targets for reducing domestic 
emissions. 
• The 2nd player B, instead, is the group of countries which are still developing 
or underdeveloped, which are interested to adopt solutions to fight the global 
warming. But these countries do not possess the technological and financial 
capabilities to invest in green technologies. According to the Paris agreement, 
one of the three main objectives is promoting resilience and adaptation 
investments in developing countries, in particular to reduce threats to food 
production. 
 
The sets of possible individual strategies 
 
The 1st player A has the technological and financial capabilities and the will to 
pursue actions aimed at producing “green" energy-saving innovative 
technologies and “green oriented products" in order to reduce dependence on 
oil, coal and gas that, at the same time, have a positive effect on the 
environment, the climate and the welfare of the citizens. 
The 2nd player B has financial and technological constraints. His choice is 
whether to follow the same strategy of A or to continue producing as before, 
without worrying about the impact on the environment. The choice also depends 
on the cooperation of A in providing the transfer of green technologies and 
financial resources to produce “green oriented good". 
This model is able to provide win-win solutions to avoid the disintegration of the 
environment. 
 
Definition of possible cooperative strategies to be determined through 
a joint decision-making of the two players 
 
The cooperative “green" strategy at a global level moves on three lines 
1. Investment in low-carbon technologies to reduce the CO2 emissions. 
2. Investment in eco-sustainable urban infrastructure with low environmental 
impact. 
3. Reduction in the emissions (production and consumption) of oil, coal and gas 
(highly polluting energies). 
 
Definition of an economic environment in which the interactive action 
takes places 
 
In the model, there is a competition between the two agents (A and B). This 
competition takes place at the level of productions, which use high technology, 
or even medium technologies with “green" purposes. 
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The competitive strategy is based on productions: x and y. These productions 
are essentially homogeneous. The product consists in the aggregate of all 
possible “green oriented products" that the two players A and B can produce 
using green technologies. 
The basic idea of the model is to shift the technology of productions towards a 
“green" frontier. In this model of competition between agents (the two groups 
of countries) the driver is the production, in particular the production of biological 
food. The model is a duopoly model à la Cournot. This model allows to find a 
solution which is profitable for both players (win-win solution). Such solution is 
profitable but it is also environmental or “green" oriented. 
 
The economic model 
 
The co-petitive model we propose hereunder must be interpreted as a normative 
model, in the sense that it will show the more appropriate solutions and win-win 
strategies chosen within a cooperative perspective, under precise conditions 
imposed by assumption. 
 
Strategies 
 
The strategy sets of the model are: 
1. the set E of strategies x of a certain country c - the possible aggregate 
biological-food production of the country c - which directly influence both payoff 
functions, in a proper game theoretic approach à la Cournot; 
2. the set F of strategies y of the rest of the word w - the possible aggregate 
biological-food production of the rest of the world w - which influence both pay-
off functions; 
3. the set C of 2-dimensional shared strategies z, set which is determined 
together by the two game players, c and the rest of the world w. 
 
Interpretation of the cooperative strategy 
 
Any vector z in C is the 2-level of aggregate investment for the environment 
sustainability economic approach, specifically z is a couple (z1, z2), where: 
1. the first component z1 is the aggregate investment and innovation, of the 
country c and of the rest of the world w, in climate technologies; 
2. the second component z2 is the aggregate algebraic sum, of the country c 
and of the rest of the world w, of economic and policy instruments (valued in 
dollars) to change the patterns of consumption of the households. 
In the model, we assume that c and w define ex-ante and together the set C of 
all cooperative strategies and (after a deep study of the co-petitive interaction) 
the couple z to implement as a possible component solution. 
 
Main strategic assumptions 
 
We assume that: 
 
any real number x, in the canonical unit interval 
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E := U = [0, 1], 
 
is a possible level of aggregate production of the country c; 
any real number y, in the same unit interval 
 
F := U = [0, 1], 
 
is the analogous aggregate production of the rest of the world w; 
a real couple (2-vector) z, belonging to the canonical square 
 
C := U2 = [0, 1]2 
 
is the 2-investment of the country c and of the rest of the world w for new low-
carbon innovative technologies, in the direction of sustainability of natural 
resources and for the environmental protection. 
 
Measure units of the strategy sets 
 
We assume that the measure units of the two intervals E and F be different:  
• the real unit 1 in E represents the maximum possible aggregate production of 
country c of a certain biological product 
• the real unit 1 in F is the maximum possible aggregate production of the rest 
of the word w, of the same good (obviously these two units represents totally 
different quantities, but - from a mathematical point of view - we need 
only a rescale on E and a rescale on F to translate our results in real unit of 
productions). 
• the real unit 1 of each factor of C is, respectively: 
- a maximum possible aggregate investment and innovation in climate 
technologies; 
- a maximum possible aggregate algebraic sum of economic and policy 
instruments to change the patterns of consumption of the households. 
 
Let us assume, so, that the country and the rest of the world decide together, 
at the end of the analysis of the game, to contribute by a 2-investment z = (z1, 
z2). 
We also consider, as payoff functions of the interaction between the country c 
and the rest of the word w, two Cournot type payoff functions, as it is shown in 
what follows. 
 
Payoff function of country c 
 
We assume that the payoff function of the country c is the function f1 of the unit 
4-cube U4 into the real line, defined by 
 
f1(x, y, z) = 4x (1 – x – y) + m1z1 + m2z2 = 4x (1 – x – y) +(m|z) 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the 4-cube U4, where 
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• m is a characteristic positive real 2-vector representing the marginal benefits 
of the investments decided by country c and by the rest of the world w upon the 
economic performances of the country c. 
 
Payoff function of the rest of the world w 
 
We assume that the payoff function of the rest of the world w is the function f2 
of the unit 4-cube U4 into the real line, defined 
by 
f2(x, y, z) = 4y (1 – y – x) + (n|z) 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the 4-cube U4, where 
 
• n is a characteristic positive real 2-vector representing the marginal benefits 
of the investments decided by country c and by the rest of the world w upon 
the economic performances of the rest of the world w itself.  
 
Remark. Note the symmetry in the influence of the pair (m, n) upon the pair of 
payoff functions (f1, f2). 
 
Payoff function of the co-petitive game 
 
We have so build up a co-petitive gain game G = (f, ≥ ), with payoff function 
 
f : U4 →R2 , 
given by 
f(x, y, z) = (4x (1 – x – y) +(m|z), 4y (1 – y – x) + (n|z))= 
= (4x (1 – x – y), 4y (1 – y – x)) + z1 (m1, n1) + z2 (m2, n2) = 
= (4x (1 – x – y), 4y (1 – y – x)) + Σ z (m: n), 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the compact 4-cube U4, where (m: n) is the 2-family 
of 2-vectors 
 
((mi, ni))1≤i≤2 = ((m1, n1), (m2, n2)) 
 
and where 
Σ z (m: n) := Σi zi (mi, ni) 
 
denotes the linear superposition (linear combination) of the family (m: n) by the 
system of coefficients z. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 
We show, in the following figures (Figures 1-4), the construction of the co-
petitive payoff space in three steps, in the particular case in which 
 
m = (-1, 1) 
and 
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n = (2, 3), 
 
just to clarify the procedure. Moreover, we shall consider here only the co-
petitive space S generated by the Pareto maximal boundary 
 
M2 = [e1, e2], 
 
since the Pareto Maximal boundary of the co-petitive game G is contained in 
this part S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Step 0: S0 :=M2 (the positive part of the Cournot payoff space). 
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Figure 2. First step: S1:=M2 + U(-1, 2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Second step: S2:= M2 + U (-1, 2) + U (1, 3). 
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Figure 4. The co-petitive dynamical path of the initial Pareto boundary M2. 
 
 
The Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space f (U4) of the co-petitive 
game G is the union of segments 
 
[P’, Q’] ∪ [Q’ R’], 
 
where the point P’ is (0, 6), the point Q’ is (1, 5) and the point R’ is (2, 3); as 
our figures are showing. 
 
Properly co-petitive solutions 
 
In a purely co-petitive fashion, the solution of the co-petitive game G must be 
searched for in the co-petitive dynamic evolution path of the Nash payoff 
 
N’ = (4/9, 4/9). 
 
Let us study this c-opetitive dynamical path. We have to start from the Nash 
payoff N’ and then generate its co-petitive trajectory 
 
N := N’ + U(-1, 2) + U(1, 3). 
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For the construction of the Nash path, as before, we can proceed step by step 
(see Figure 5-6-7). 
 
 
Figure 5. Step 0: N’. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. First step: N’+ U (-1, 2). 
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Figure 7. Second step: N’+ U (-1, 2) + U (1, 3). 
 
In Figure 8, we show the Kalai-Smorodinsky purely co-petitive payoff solution 
with respect to the Nash payoff (the point H). This is the solution of the classic 
bargaining problem  
 
(∂* N, N’), 
 
where ∂* N is the Pareto maximal boundary of the Nash path N and the threat 
point of the problem is the old initial Nash-Cournot payoff N’. 
The payoff solution H is obtained by the intersection of the part of the Nash 
Pareto boundary which stays over N’ (in this specific case, the whole of the Nash 
Pareto boundary) and the segment connecting the threat point N’ with the 
supremum of the above part of the Nash Pareto boundary. 
Then we consider another purely co-petitive solution H’, obtained by using as a 
treat point the infimum of the maximal boundary of the Nash path. 
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Figure 8. Kalai-Smorodinsky purely coopetitive payoff solutions: H and H’. 
 
In this game, the two Kalai-Smorodinsky purely coopetitive payoff solutions H 
and H’ are not optimal with respect to the Transferable Utility approach, 
neither they belong to the maximal Pareto boundary of the game. 
 
Super-Cooperative Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions 
 
The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, with respect to the infimum of the 
payoff space, equals the intersection of the diagonal segment 
 
[inf G, sup G] 
and the Pareto boundary M. 
 
This solution equals the point K of the segment [Q’, R’]. This point K represents 
a good win-win solution with respect to the initial (shadow maximum) supremum 
(1, 1) of the pure Cournot game. 
The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, with respect to the infimum of the 
Pareto boundary, equals the intersection of the diagonal segment 
 
[inf M, sup M] 
 
and the Pareto boundary M itself, and is the point 
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K’ = (1,5). 
 
This point K’ represents a good win-win solution with respect to the initial 
(shadow maximum) supremum (1, 1) of the pure Cournot game and is also 
optimal from the TU (transferable utility) point of view (see Figure 9). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Super-cooperative Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in the payoff space: K 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 10, we show a confrontation between the Nash path and the Pareto 
path, as well as a confrontation between the solutions H, H’, K and K’. It is 
evident that none of the Nash points reveals Pareto efficient. In particular, the 
fair solution H’ is strictly less than the fair solution K’. 
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Figure 10. Confrontation between the solutions H, H’, K and K’. 
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper proposes an environmentally sustainable global economy. The model 
which represents this economy looks both at the production side and the 
consumption side. Regarding the production side, the model considers 
investment and innovation in climate technologies, whereas on the consumption 
side it takes into account economic and policy instruments to change the 
patterns of consumption of the households. The model, based on a theoretical 
framework à la Cournot, follows a game theory approach. Such a model provides 
win-win solutions, namely strategic situations in which each country takes 
advantages by cooperating and competing at the same time within the global 
economy, and where each country gets a positive return, in order 
to achieve an inclusive and sustainable industrial development. In fact, the 
model shows the convenience for each country to 
cooperate and implement policies in order to fully satisfy the basic requirements 
of UNIDO 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in terms of production, 
consumption and climate change. 
In particular, our co-opetitive model shows win-win solutions, upon a Pareto 
optimal frontier, of a co-opetitive strategic interaction aiming at a policy of 
environmental sustainability and implementing a green economy. This policy 
concerns 
1. investment and innovation in climate technologies. The application of 
innovative energy-efficient production processes along with the utilization of 
renewable energy sources enables countries in the determination of their output 
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to follow a low-carbon and low-emission growth path with huge benefits for the 
climate and the environment 
2. economic and policy instruments, based on taxation and incentives, to change 
the patterns of consumption of the households, taking into account the 
determination of aggregate output of biological food of any country c in a non-
cooperative game à la Cournot with the rest of the world. 
The analytical features of the model are: 
1. first, we defined z as the cooperative strategy, which is the instrumental 2-
vector (2 dimensions) of the environmental sustainability policy, concerning both 
production and consumption; 
2. second, we adopted a non-cooperative game à la Cournot for establishing an 
equilibrium bi-level (x, y), that represents the levels of outputs of country c and 
of the rest of the world w in production of biological food; 
3. third, we suggested two types of solutions: 
- two pure payoff co-petitive solutions (Fig. 8). Respectively, H, which is the 
Kalai-Smorodinsky purely co-petitive payoff solution with respect to the Nash 
payoff, and H’, which is a purely co-petitive solution obtained by using as a treat 
point the infimum of the maximal boundary of the Nash path. 
- two super-cooperative solutions K and K’ belonging to the co-petitive maximal 
Pareto boundary of our game (Fig. 9). K and K’ are determined by adopting the 
Kalai-Smorodinsky method with two different threat points, thus obtaining two 
best Pareto compromise solutions of which K’ is also optimal from the TU 
(transferable utility) point of view. The main feature of this second solution is 
that it is an optimal and fair solution. 
4. Finally, we provided a confrontation between the solutions H, H’, K and K’, 
showing the Nash path and the Pareto path (Fig.10). None of the Nash points 
reveals Pareto efficient. In particular, the fair solution H’ is strictly less than the 
fair solution K’. 
 
To define more specifically the possible practical implications of our model, let 
us consider the payoff K'. We easily obtain such a payoff compromise solution 
as the result of infinite possible global politics (profile strategy), one elementary 
way (perhaps two polarized, but we desire only two propose an elementary 
example) appearing the following one: 
 
K' = f(1/2,0,1,1) . 
 
In other terms, a possible agreement could be the profile strategy defined by 
the following components: 
 
1. player one produces and sells on the global market 1/2 million pieces of 
production (that is 1/2 of the critical production of the Cournot game, 
considering it equal to 1 Million); 
2. player two produces its vegan heathy food for its internal consumption, 
but sells 0 in the global market; 
3. the players decide together to invest the maximum possible amount of 
money for their common investment vector strategy z. 
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